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Sequentially Distributed Coalition Formation Game
for Throughput Maximization in C-RANs
Abiodun Gbenga-Ilori, and Olufunmilayo Sanusi
Abstract—Cloud radio access network (C-RAN) has been pro-
posed as a solution to reducing the huge cost of network upgrade
while providing the spectral and energy efficiency needed for
the new generation cellular networks. In order to reduce the
interference that occur in C-RAN and maximize throughput,
this paper proposes a sequentially distributed coalition formation
(SDCF) game in which players, in this case the remote radio heads
(RRHs), can sequentially join multiple coalitions to maximize
their throughput. Contrary to overlapping coalition formation
(OCF) game where players contribute fractions of their limited
resources to different coalitions, the SDCF game offers better
stability by allowing sequential coalition formation depending on
the availability of resources and therefore providing a balance
between efficient spectrum use and interference management. An
algorithm for the proposed model is developed based on the
merge-only method. The performance of the proposed algorithm
in terms of stability, complexity and convergence to final coalition
structure is also investigated. Simulation results show that the
proposed SDCF game did not only maximize the throughput in
the C-RAN, but it also shows better performances and larger
capabilities to manage interference with increasing number of
RRHs compared to existing methods.
Keywords—Coalition game, C-RAN, SDCF, throughput, inter-
ference, wireless networks
I. INTRODUCTION
AS mobile telecommunication technologies evolve towards5G, operators are in the quest to meet network demands in
terms of coverage, capacity and data rates. Massive deployment
of base stations to accomodate these needs will incur huge cost
which may not necessarily yield a proportional revenue. Inter-
cell interference resulting from massive deployment of base
stations can cause significant degradation which may affect the
overall system performance, [1]. Besides interference, traffic
fluctuation at each base transceiver station (BTS) may lead to
underutilization of resources [2].
Cloud radio access network (C-RAN) has been proposed
as a solution to these challenges, [3], and it is particularly
fitting to industry shift towards network function virtualization
and self-organizing network, [4], [5]. The C-RAN architecture
splits the base station into two parts; the baseband unit (BBU)
which is responsible for the computational processing tasks
and the remote radio head (RRH) which is responsible for
the basic radio processing functionalities [1]. In contrast
with the conventional RAN, splitting the BBU from the RRH
allows the BBU to be co-located in a centralized location
A. Gbenga-Ilori is with Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering,
University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria (email: gbengailori@unilag.edu.ng).
O. Sanusi is with Computer and Electrical Engineering Department,
Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria (email:
sanusi.olufunmi@oouagoiwoye.edu.ng).
called the BBU pool. Centralizing baseband processing in
a pool, coupled with cooperative radio and real-time cloud
computing in C-RAN provides the benefits of cost saving,
spectral and energy efficiency, load balancing gains, increased
flexibility in the network upgrade and performance, [1], [2].
Furthermore, the RRH separation from the BBU facilitates
dense deployment which leads to higher achievable rates and
better exploitation of frequency resources among multiple
cells [6]. Two types of interference are possible in C-RANs;
intra-cell interference and inter-cell interference. Though intra-
cell interference in C-RAN can be reduced by adopting
the orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA)
technique, inter-cell interference caused by high deployment
density of RRHs can significantly disrupt system throughput.
If not addressed, this challenge places a barrier on the benefits
offered by the C-RAN architecture.
Due to the centralization feature in C-RAN, joint processing
and coordination technique such as coordinated multi-point
(CoMP) transmission and reception was proposed in [7],
[8] as an efficient tool to improve the coverage of high
data rates and system throughput. An alternating optimization
based compressive sensing recovery algorithm was used at
the BBU to achieve interference mitigation and data recovery
performance in [9]. The authors in [10] proposed time-reversal
communication to alleviate interference in C-RAN, in which an
optimal content-aware waveform design is used in the downlink
transmission and an optimal recovery design is used in the
uplink transmission to alleviate interference in C-RANs. In
[11], a joint optimization of user grouping, virtual base station
clustering and iterative transmit beamforming was proposed for
system utility maximization by mitigating intra-cell and inter-
cell interference. Other interference management mechanisms
were considered in [12], [13] to maximize system throughput.
Though the above interference mitigation schemes have
achieved some level of successes, however, modeling inter-
ference situation in wireless networks cannot be completely
solved analytically. This is because in real life scenarios,
modern network nodes are characterized by distributed and
self-organizing features which make them able to independently
adapt to necessary changes within the network. Thus, game
theory is an ideal tool for modeling interactions among a
number of interdependent, selfish decision maker [14], [15].
Lately, there has been a shift in network architecture from
the familiar centralized and homogeneous architecture to a
decentralized and heterogeneous architecture, which requires
network device autonomy and cooperation. Cooperative game
theory, in particular the coalition formation (CF) game, provides
the framework for modeling and developing self-organizing
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techniques for forming coalition based on the mutual cost and
benefit of cooperation [16], [17].
Extensive research on the application of coalition game
for interference management has been considered in existing
literature. Authors in [18], [19], [20] considered femtocell
networks while C-RAN was considered in [21], [22], [23].
In [21], a self-optimal coalition formation algorithm based
on a defection order was proposed to reduce intra-coalition
interference and improve spectrum efficiency. In the paper, the
BBU acts as a central entity to assign the RRHs to different
coalitions that ensures that maximum individual and average
coalition utility is obtained. A cooperative transmission in the
downlink was presented in [22], where a hybrid multiple access
mode was introduced in the coalition to improve spectrum
efficiency. Authors in [23] designed a distributed local altruistic
utility function for the social welfare maximization of each
RRHs while CoMP scheme was adopted within the coalition
to mitigate interference in a hyper-dense scenario.
Recently, there has been an extension of the coalition
formation game to overlapping coalition formation (OCF) game.
Most practical cases involve nodes suffering from multiple
interferers simultaneously, or a node interfering with multiple
nodes in a network. Overlapping coalition game allows network
nodes to participate in multiple coalitions simultaneously and
contribute part of their limited resources to these different
coalitions, thus providing flexibility for the players to utilize
resources which results in outcomes with higher payoffs [24].
A number of papers [25], [26], [27], [28], have utilized the
OCF game model in various cellular networks. In [25], a
decentralized algorithm was proposed that allows small cell
base station to interact and make independent cooperative
decision. Authors in [26] developed an OCF game model
for collaborative smartphone sensing to improve the quality
of smartphone applications. In [27], a distributed multi-hop
coalition based on cooperative routing and scheduling algorithm
was proposed for cognitive radio networks. Authors in [28]
considered interference coordination in Device-to-Device (D2D)
under-laying LTE-A network. However, the merge and split
rule deployed involves dynamic joining and quitting a coalition
as there is no actual concurrent participation of the players in
different coalitions. Though OCF game is able to achieve better
network throughput compared to CF games, a player in multiple
overlapping coalitions may however deviate from some of the
coalitions and therefore withdraw the resources contributed.
This causes instability and complicates the computation of the
total OCF payoff.
In this paper, we consider a sequentially distributed coalition
formation (SDCF) game model among RRHs to study downlink
interference mitigation in an ultra-dense C-RAN with RRHs
serving the UEs within its coverage. Similar to the OCF game,
our proposed SCFG game is dynamic in that it allows players
to participate in multiple coalitions however the coalition
formation is done sequentially. Rather than contributing portion
of their resources to different coalitions, players form coalitions
sequentially depending on the availability of resources. In
contrast with the merge and split method used in OCF games,
the merge only method is adopted in this paper to prevents the
players from deviating from the coalitions they have formed.
This places a limit on the number of coalitions formed and
ensure that players maximize their payoffs from the current
coalitions they are in. It also discourages frequent deviation
of players from their coalitions and foster the stability of the
coalition structure.
A number of literature where coalition game is used to study
interference in C-RAN adopted a cooperative transmission
within the coalition, coordinated by the time division multiple
access (TDMA) technique. This method is not likely to yield
an optimum system performance in a hyper-dense network
since UEs are allotted time slots in the time frame within
the coalition. We propose a handover and power control
interference mitigation scheme in which an intracell handover
is performed in the interfering RRH to curb interference in
the victim RRH. Where this is not possible due to the traffic
condition in the interfering RRH, a power control mechanism
is adopted.
Due to the high deployment density, certain RRHs will be
affected by co-channel interference from neighbouring RRHs.
In our proposed model, the RRHs in a coalition are classified as
seekers or conceders; with the victim RRH becoming the seeker
and the interfering RRH becoming the conceder. Coalition
formation decision depends on the expected utility of the RRH
with the ultimate goal of maximizing the system throughput.
RRHs can act cooperatively to form multiple coalitions with
each other and perform a handover or adopt power optimization
technique to manage the interference. To ensure stability of
the final coalition structure, we adopt a merge-only method.
The main contribution of the work is summarized as follows:
• proposal of a sequentially distributed coalition formation
(SDCF) game based on handover technique for cooper-
ative interference management and system throughput
enhancement in C-RANs,
• formulation of an algorithm for the proposed model and
proof of convergence to a stable coalition structure, and
• proposal of a power optimization technique to mitigate
interference within the coalition in the event that the
handover-based SDCF game cannot be implemented.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. System model is
described in Section II. Section III presents the SDCF algorithm,
as well as the stability and convergence of the proposed game.
Numerical simulation and analysis is demonstrated in Section
IV while the concluding remarks are given in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a downlink transmission scenario in C-RAN with
an ultra-dense deployment of RRHs within the coverage of
the macrocell base station (MBS). Each RRH is connected to
a pool of BBUs through the optical fibre fronthaul link and
serves the user equipment (UEs) within its coverage. The UEs
served by the same RRH are assigned orthogonal sub-channels
so that transmission can take place concurrently without mutual
interference. However, there exist co-channel interference
generated by neighboring RRHs to the UEs served by other
RRHs operating in the same channel. This is particularly severe
for UEs located at the edge of a cell, as strong interfering
signals from adjacent cells can affect the data rate of the UEs
as they move farther away from their serving RRHs.
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Let N = {na, nb, · · · , nn} denote the set of all RRHs with
each RRH n ∈ N serving a set of U = {u1, u2, · · · , ui} UEs
that has been assigned H orthogonal sub-carriers denoted by
the set Hn = {h1, h2, · · · , hH}. Let gn,n be channel gain from
RRH n to its UE ui while Pn denote transmit power of RRH
n and σ2 is the variance of the additive white Gaussian noise.
I0 and In,N are the interference from the MBS and from other
RRHs respectively. The received signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) of UE ui served by RRH n ∈ N on the
sub-channel hf ∈ Hn is given by:
SINR
hf
n =
Pngn,n
I0 + In,N + σ2
, (1)
and
where I0 = P0gn,0, In,N =
∑
m∈N Pmgn,m, and m 6= n.
The transmit power of RRH m ∈ N using sub-channel hf is
Pm while gn,m is the channel gain from RRH m to ui. The
transmit power of the MBS is Pm while gn,0 is the channel
gain from MBS to ui. The achievable Shannon rate of ui on
sub-channel hf is given by:
R
hf
n = log2(1 +
Pngn,n
I0 + In,N + σ2
). (2)
Since the throughput of the RRH is a function of the
performance of UEs attached to it, thus, the throughput for
RRH n ∈ N serving U UEs is defined by:
RHn =
∑
h∈H
log2(1 +
Pngn,n
I0 + In,N + σ2
). (3)
From Fig. 1, without loss of generality, we consider
three RRHs in the network: na, nb and nc. Let Ua =
{Ua1 , Ua2 , · · · , Uae} be the set of UEs in na, Ub =
{Ub1 , Ub2 , · · · , Ubf } is the set of UEs in nb and Uc =
{Uc1 , Uc2 , · · · , Ucg} is the set of UEs in nc, uba1 and uca2
are at the cell-edge served by na and are being interfered by
nb and nc respectively. This interference situation can cause
significant degradation in the sum throughput of the affected
RRH in a non-cooperative scenario. To mitigate interference,
na can act cooperatively by forming coalitions with nb and
nc in a distributed manner as shown in Fig. 2, by adopting a
handover and power optimization scheme within the coalitions.
With the centralization of the BBU in C-RAN, handover
events results in performance gain in terms of reduced signaling,
simplified procedure and reduced handover delay. Furthermore,
there is a decrease in handover failure rate which consequently
enhances user experience [29]. For the handover to take place,
there must be free sub-channel in the interfering RRH. However,
this may not always be possible due to the traffic load and
the interference condition in that sub-channel. Thus a power
optimization scheme will, in this case, be adopted within the
coalition to reduce interference. The list of notations is given
in Table I.
III. SEQUENTIALLY DISTRIBUTED COALITION FORMATION
GAME
The aim of this work is to improve overall system throughput
by maximizing the data rate of UEs and hence, the sum through-
puts of the RRHs cooperatively. In conventional coalition
Fig. 1. Model for C-RAN in a Non-Cooperative Scenario
Fig. 2. Model for C-RAN in a Cooperative Scenario
games, the players are restricted to participating in only one
coalition at a time or at best are modeled to dynamically join
and quit a coalition. Here, we propose a sequentially distributed
coalition formation (SDCF) game model in which the players
can belong to multiple coalitions simultaneously to improve
the spectral efficiency and performance of the system.
We assume all RRHs are in singleton, meaning a coalition
with only one RRH in it. We define two types of RRHs in
the network: seekers denoted by ns and conceders denoted
by nc. The seeker is the RRH that is being interfered and
requests a merger with the interfering RRH while the conceder
is the interfering RRH that receives a merger request and
agrees to merge. With this concept, a RRH can either be a
seeker or a conceder depending on whether it is interfering or
being interfered. In particular, ns has an incentive to cooperate
because the interference affecting its UEs will be minimized
and its throughput will improve. On the other hand, nc also
has an incentive to cooperate because its cooperation will it
earn a weight assigned by the central entity, which is the BBU.
Moreover, since the overall system throughput will increase,
each RRH in the network have strong incentive to cooperate
to improve the system utility.
To mitigate interference, each RRH utilize the received signal
strength indicator (RSSI) feedback measurement from its UEs
to create a list of interferers, ranking them in descending order.
Depending on the payoffs, the RRH forms a new coalition
partition with the interfering RRH after negotiation and a
handover or power optimization is adopted within the coalition.
From Fig. 2, ua1 served by na, is interfered by a number of
interferers with a sequence ( nb, nj . . . nc), and sorted from
strongest to weakest. We assume na is serving ua1 on sub-
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channel hB and nb, serving ub1 on the same sub-channel is
interfering with ua1 . Therefore na becomes the seeker and nb,
the conceder. Cooperatively, na and nb may decide to merge
and form a new coalition. Once a coalition is formed, nb will
offer part of its available free sub-channel, say hC , with the
best channel condition. Then ub1 , currently using channel hB
will be transferred to hC to release hB and thus eliminate
interference to ua1 . Similarly, na will form coalitions with
other interferers using the same process in order to reduce
the interference in its UEs. However, the number of coalitions
formed by ns is limited by:
RSSi ≥ RSSmin, (4)
where RSSi is the received signal strength of the interferer
and RSSmin is the minimum acceptable interfering received
signal strength.
This implies that a seeker RRH will only form a coalition
with conceders if the RSS of the interferer is greater than
a given minimum. The number of coalition formed by nc is
limited by:
hs ∈ Hs ≤ hc ∈ Hc, (5)
where Hs the set of ns’s sub-channels interfered by nc, and
Hc is the set of sub-channel available for handover at nc.
This implies that at every request from ns for a merger, nc
checks if equation (5) is satisfied before forming a coalition.
Therefore, the elements of Hc is decreased as more coalitions
are formed by nc. If there are no free sub-channels from nc
due to the traffic situation, in which case Hc = ∅, a power
control techniques will be adopted according to equations (6)
and (7):
minimize P c , (6)
subject to Rc ≥ Rcmin and,
Rs ≥ Rsmin,
(7)
where P c is the transmit power of nc, Rc and Rs are the
sum throughput of nc and ns respectively, Rsmin and R
c
minare
the minimum acceptable rate for the seeker and conceder
respectively. If handover or power control is not possible, the
request for a merger is rejected.
Definition 1: A sequentially distributed coalition formation
(SDCF) game G = (N, v) with non-transferable utility (NTU),
where N a set of players, in this case the RRHs, and v is the
function that maps the payoffs to the players in the coaltion.
The coalition structure piN is defined by {φ1, φ2, · · · , φL}.
SDCF game has non-transferable utility because the value of
the coalition v(φk), cannot be arbitrarily divided amongst its
members but instead each member has its own value within
the coalition. Since each RRH n ∈ N is initialized to be a
singleton, the payoff before a merger is sum-rate of the UEs
connected to the RRH and defined by:
TABLE I
LIST OF NOTATIONS.
Symbol Definition
vs, vs′ Payoff of ns before and after coalition respectively
vc, vc′ Payoff of nc before and after coalition respectively
φk k
th coalition
piN , pi
′
N Coalition structure over a set of player N before and after
coalition
Rs, Rs′ Sum throughput of ns before and after coalition
Rc, Rc′ Sum throughput of nc before and after merging
Cs, Cc Cost of coalition formation for ns and nc respectively
wj Additional payoff value for nc
Hs, Hc Sets of orthogonal subcarriers allocated to ns and nc
vsE
′ Total payoff of ns for participating in E coalitions
vsJ
′ Total payoff of nc for participating in J coalitions
L Number of coalitions
N The set of RRHs in the C-RAN
U The set of user equipment connected to the RRH
Rs, Rc Sum throughput of ns and nc respectively, in all coalitions
formed
vs(φk, piN ) =R
s(φk, piN ) =∑
hs∈Hs
log2(1 +
Pngn,n
I0 +
∑
m∈N
m/∈n
Pmgn,m + σ2
)
(8)
vc(φk, piN ) =R
c(φk, piN ) =∑
hc∈Hc
log2(1 +
Pngn,n
I0 +
∑
m∈N
m/∈n
Pmgn,m + σ2
).
(9)
The new rates after coalition is formed is defined by:
Rs′(φ′k, pi
′
N ) =
∑
h′s∈Hs
log2(1+
Pngn,n
I0 +
∑
m∈N\K
m/∈n
Pmgn,m + σ2
),
(10)
Rc′(φ′k, pi
′
N ) =
∑
h′c∈Hc
log2(1 +
Pngn,n
I0 +
∑
m∈N
m/∈n
Pmgn,m + σ2
),
(11)
where K is a subset of RRHs that have conceeded to form
coalitions with RRH n. After a merger to form a coalition,
the cost of information exchange, Cs and Cc for seeker and
conceder respectively is taken into account:
vs′(φ′k, pi
′
N ) = R
s′(φ′k, pi
′
N )− Cs, (12)
vc′(φ′k, pi
′
N ) = R
c′(φ′k, pi
′
N )− Cc + wj . (13)
Practically, each RRH exhibit selfish characteristics in that
it will only form coalition if its current payoff is increased. A
weight function, wj , is therefore introduced as an additional
value to the payoff of the nc if its payoff will remain constant
after a coalition. However no weight function is added if the
payoff will increase after the coalition is formed as stated in
equation (14). The weight is proportional to the conceder’s
contribution towards improving the payoff of the seeker. The
payoff of ns will definitely improve after a coalition because
interference in its UEs will be reduced, but nc will only
have a strong incentive to form a coalition if its payoff also
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increases. To increase the overall system throughput, the weight
is enforced by the BBU as the central entity.
wj =

0, vc′(φ′k, pi
′
N ) > v
c(φk, piN ),
τ
(hg
hr
)
, vc′(φ′k, pi
′
N ) ≤ vc(φk, piN ) handover,
µ
( Rsmin
Rstarget
)
, vc′(φ′k, pi
′
N ) ≤ vc(φk, piN ) power control .
(14)
hg is the number of sub-channels granted by conceder while
hr is the amount of sub-channels requested by seeker, and this
depends on the number of UEs being interfered by the conceder.
τ is a positive constant. Since power optimization is with
respect to a rate constraint, the weight for power control can be
defined as a function of the rate. Rstarget is the target throughput
for ns, Rsmin is the minimum rate achieved by n
s after power
control by nc, µ is a positive constant. The total payoff of the
seeker and conceder for participating simultaneously in more
than one coalition is the sum of its throughput in E and J
coalitions respectively and written as:
vsE
′ =
E∑
e=1
vs′(φ′k, pi
′
N ), (15)
vcJ
′ =
J∑
j=1
vc′(φ′k, pi
′
N ). (16)
The payoff of the coalition structure is defined as:
v(pi′N ) =
L∑
l=1
v(φ′k). (17)
The goal of the paper is to maximize the overall system
throughput as defined as equations (18) and (19):
maximize Rn(N) =
∑
n∈N
∑
h∈H
log2(1 +
Pngn,n
I0 + In,N + σ2
) ,
(18)
subject to Rs(N) =
E∑
e=1
Rs′(φ′k, pi
′
N ), and
Rc(N) =
J∑
j=1
Rc′(φ′k, pi
′
N ).
(19)
Definition 2: Given a distributed coalition structure defined
as piN = {φ1, φ2, · · · , φL}, where L is the number of
coalitions. We define a sequential coalition formation game
where players can simultaneously participate in different
coalitions, such that there exists φα, φβ ∈ piN , α 6= β such that
φα ∩ φβ = ∅ . This means that the performance of the system
can be significantly improved instead of players joining and
quitting a coalition dynamically.
Definition 3: Given two coalition structures pii and pij of
a sequentially distributed coalition formation (SDCF) game
G = (N, v), we say that the preference order for RRH n is
denoted by pij  pii if RRH n prefers to switch from pii to pij .
Therefore, we express it as:
vn(φ
∗
k, pij)  vn(φk, pii), (20)
v(pij)  v(pii). (21)
This relations in Definition 3 guarantee the individual payoff
of RRH n in the new coalition will increase and the total
coalition structure will not decrease.
Definition 4: Consider the initial coalition structure piN =
{φ1, φ2, · · · , φL}, where each φL is a singleton coalition. We
define a new coalition structure such that any φk ⊂ N can
agree to merge and form new optimal coalition structure pi∗N =⋃L
k=1 φk. To maintain stability and ease the convergence of the
coalition structure, we adopt a merge-only principle that ensure
that once the merging process occurs, players cannot leave the
coalition until a period os time during which communication
takes place.
Algorithm 1 SDCF Game for Interference Mitigation in an
C-RANs
Initialization: The RRH are initialized to be in singletons.
The C-RAN with N RRHs are partitioned by
piN = {φ1, φ2, · · · , φL} at time t = 0. Each RRH computes
its current payoff, v(φk, piN ) as in equations (8) and (9).
Phase 1: Interference Detection.
1: Each RRH detect potential coalition partners by obtain-
ing interference measurements from neighbouring RRHs
through received signal strength indicator (RSSI) feedback
from the UEs
2: Interfering RRHs are sorted in descending order from
strongest to weakest interferer. The interfering RRHs are
considered for cooperation according to equation (4).
Phase 2: Distributed Coalition Formation.
Merge-only rule is adopted
Repeat for each ns and nc
1: Update time index t = t+ 1
2: Each RRH i ∈ Ncomputes its payoff for forming a
coalition with an interfering RRH
3: if the payoff is improved according to equation (12) and
equation (4) is satisfied then
4: RRH i sends a proposal to merge
5: i ∈ N becomes ns
6: else RRH i remains in present coalition
7: end if
8: Each RRH j ∈ N that receives a merger request, calculates
its payoff for merging to form new partition according
equation (13)
9: if the payoff is improved than present payoff and equations
(5) is satisfied then
10: The coalition merging request is granted and a new
partition is formed
11: j ∈ N becomes nc
12: else Coalition request is rejected
13: end if
14: until Convergence to a stable coalition structure
Phase 3: Intra-coalition Interference mitigation.
A handover or power control scheme is adopted within the
coalition to mitigate interference
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1) The SDCF Game Algorithm: The proposed SDCF algo-
rithm is in three phases; interference detection, the sequentially
distributed coalition formation and intra-coalition interference
mitigation as shown in Algorithm 1. Initially, at time t = 0, the
network is partitioned by N singletons and the current payoff of
each RRH is computed. The first phase starts with interference
detection in which the RSSI from the neighbouring cells is
reported to the RRHs through feedback from the UEs. With the
RSSI measurement, the RRH identifies potential cooperative
partners from the list of interferers according to equation (4) and
sorts them in descending order, that is, strongest to weakest. In
the second phase, each RRH computes the possible payoff that
will result from a merger with an interfering RRH according
to equation (12). With an improved payoff, the RRH sends
a merging request to interfer RRHs above acceptable limit
on the list. The RRH that send the request then becomes ns.
On receiving the proposal, the interfering RRH computes its
payoff according to equation (13). If its payoff is improves and
equations (5) is satisfied, the merger proposal will be accepted
and the interfering RRH becomes nc. Once the merger takes
place, the RRHs are committed to remaining in the coalition.
The process is repeated for each ns and nc until convergence
to a final coalition structure is reached. In the final phase,
a handover or power control scheme is adopted within the
coalition to mitigate interference.
2) Convergence and Stability: We will proof the conver-
gence and stability for Algorithm 1.
Corollary III.0.1. The proposed SDCF game algorithm con-
verges to a final coalition structure.
Proof. ns will only tend to request a merger if equation (4)
is satisfied while nc will agree to a merger if equation (5)
is satisfied. Specifically, ns will form coalition with potential
partners whose interference level is greater than the acceptable
minimum and nc will consider a merger if there is free sub-
channel for handover or if there is a possibility of power
optimization. Consequently, the number of coalitions formed
is finite. In such a case, merge-only method guarantee that the
process converges to final stable coalition structure after finite
number of steps.
Corollary III.0.2. The final coalition structure pi∗N of the
SDCF game algorithm is stable.
Proof. The outcome of SDCF game G = (N, v) is stable if
RRH n ∈ N , where n ∈ φi and n ∈ φj for φi, φj ∈ piN has no
incentive to leave current coalitions. In the proposed algorithm,
each RRH n that agrees to merge remains in the coalition
following the merge-only principle. However, they can join
other coalitions sequentially provided the necessary criteria is
satisfied. If the final coalition structure pi∗N is not stable, then
there exist an RRH n ∈ N that quits its coalition φi ∈ pi∗N
to form a new coalition structure pi′N = pi
∗
N\φi
⋃
pi∗N\n. For
this to occur, RRH n must perform a preference order switch
which contradicts the fact that pi∗N is the final coalition structure
resulting from the convergence of the proposed algorithm.
Also, a preference order switch contradicts the merge-only rule
defined, which ensures that players remain committed to a
TABLE II
SIMULATION PARAMETERS, [22].
Parameters V alues
Carrier frequency 2 GHz
RRH transmit power 30 dBm
RRH/UE antenna gain 2/0dBi
Number od RRH 7 to 16
Pathloss model (dB) 18.7 x log10(d[m]) + 46.8 + 20log10( 2.75 )
coalition once it is formed. Hence the final coalition structure
pi∗N is stable.
Corollary III.0.3. The proposed Algorithm 1 yields a stable
coalition in O(n) time.
Proof. The complexity of our algorithm is dependent on the
coalitions formed by the conceder RRH nc, which is directly
related to the number of merge proposals sent by each ns.
Merge proposals from ns can either be accepted by nc or
rejected. In the case of rejection, ns remains in the present
coalition because no other coalition can reduce the interference
from nc. Therefore, the complexity order of the proposed
algorithm is O(n).
IV. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed SDCF
game model, we consider a 150 x 150 m2 macro cell with a
single MBS and between 7 to 16 randomly distributed RRHs
within the coverage of the mobile base station (MBS). Each
RRH has a radius of 20m and serves only four UEs. We
set the sum of the interference from the MBS and the noise
power equal to -30dBm. The other parameters considered in
the simulation are summarized on Table II. MATLAB was
used for the simulations.
Fig. 3 shows a snapshot of the final coalition structure
resulting from the algorithm with N = 7 . All RRHs act non-
cooperatively initially at t = 0. As the iteration process begins,
the interfered RRHs identifies cooperative potential partners
in order to minimize its interference. Results show that six(6)
coalitions are formed. The final coalition structure is described
by pi∗N = {(n1n3), (n1n2), (n4n5), (n1n4), (n6), (n7)}. RRH
n1 forms a multiple coalitions; it acts as ns in coalitions 1
and 4 and as nc in coalition 2. RRHs n2 and n3 are each in a
single coalition while n6 and n7 prefers to remain in singleton
because of the cost of coalition formation considering their
relative distance. From the above we can see that a RRH n
can be both ns and nc as in the case of n1 and n4. Fig. 4
shows the performance of the proposed algorithm in terms of
the system throughput as a function of the number of RRHs.
Compared with the non-cooperative method, we see an increase
in throughput with our proposed model as the number of RRH
is increased. However, the difference in performance of both
models is not significant when the number of RRH in the
C-RAN is low. As n increases, we see a significant increase
in the throughput with the proposed model because of the
impact of coalition formation on interference mitigation. This
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Fig. 3. A stable distributed coalition structure for N = 7
performance again drops as n increases beyond a certain limit.
This is because there is more interference in the CRAN as
n increases and there is a constraint on sub-channel needed
for the handover scheme. More of the nc, therefore decide to
use power optimization scheme for the coalition which may
occasionally impact on the throughput.
Fig. 5 shows the average throughput of the conceder, nc,
before and after a merger to form a coalition. It can be seen
that there is no drop in throughput as the rate remain the same
as it was before the coalition. This is because nc will rather
not consider a merger than join a coalition that will reduce the
rate in its cell.
The performance of our proposed SDCF game is also
validated by comparing the average interference that results
in a C-RAN with our algorithm with an existing one known
as self optimal coalition formation algorithm (SOCFA), [22],
which is also applied to C-RANs to mitigate interference. This
is shown in Fig. 6. It can be seen that the average interference
in both models increase as n increases. However, compared
with (SOCFA), there is reduction in the average interference in
the C-RAN with our proposed model. Therefore, our algorithm
shows better performance.
Fig. 4. System Throughput versus number of RRH in the C-RAN
Fig. 7 shows a comparison of the system throughput when
handover or power control technique is used with respect to
the number of RRHs in the network. The results from these
two are also compared with a non-cooperative scenario where
the RRHs do not form any coalitions. As seen from the figure,
Fig. 5. Average Throughput of nc Before and After Merger
Fig. 6. Average Interference in CRAN: SDCF Game Versus SOCFA
Fig. 7. Average Throughput: Handover Versus Power Control
handover technique gave the best throughput results. However,
with the limited frequency resource available in C-RANs, power
control could still be used to reduce interference and increase
throughput in the network as the throughput achieved can be
seen to be quite close to that of the handover technique. In
general, the cooperative techniques achieved better result than
the non-cooperative method.
From Fig. 8, it is observed that the average weight function
for nc decreases as the number of RRH increases. As nc form
more coalitions, the number of frequency resource available
decreases and nc can no longer grant all channel requests from
ns. Similarly, for power control, enforcing a power control
mechanism gets more stringent as multiple coalition formation
could degrade the QoS of nc.
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Fig. 8. Average Weight Function for nc
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a sequentially distributed coalition formation
(SDCF) game is proposed for maximizing the throughput in
C-RANs. This is necessary in order to reduce interference in
these networks and meet the high data rate requirements of
new generation cellular networks. The proposed algorithm is
based on a merge-only method that incorporates a handover or
power control interference schemes. The proposed cooperative
model is compared with a non-cooperative model and an
existing cooperative model known as SOCFA. Of all the three
models, results show that our proposed algorithm produced
the best throughput in the C-RAN. Compared with SOCFA,
the proposed algorithm shows a better average interference per
number of RRH in the C-RAN.
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